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PUNISHING THE PARENT: CORPORATE
CRIMINAL COMPLICITY IN HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES
Jonathan Clough*
“We are seeking to prevent . . . the perpetuation of a double standard
under which most foreign corporations, as well as their home governments, operate. There is one set of standards—legal and moral—in
domestic operations; but a completely different and much lower set of
standards when these same entities are operating abroad, particularly
in much poorer countries. This dichotomy is wrong, and the governments in the industrialized world have the means of preventing it: by
applying extraterritorially many of the domestic and international
standards that are adopted and enforced at home.”∗∗

INTRODUCTION

E

nsuring the accountability of multinational corporations
(“MNCs”)1 for their conduct in the developing world is one of the
great legal challenges of our time. From humble beginnings, the legal
fiction that is “the corporation” has evolved into a behemoth, central to
the functioning of the world economy.2 It has been estimated that between twenty-nine3 and fifty-one4 of the one hundred largest economies
are MNCs. In 2005, there were approximately 77,000 MNCs, with
770,000 foreign affiliates, generating an estimated $4.5 trillion in value
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University.
∗∗ Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United
States Law and the Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to
Domestic and International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 145 (1996)
(emphasis removed).
1. Multinational corporations (“MNCs”) are corporations that are incorporated in
one country but operate in one or more other countries. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5–8 (2d ed. 2007). Other terms found in the
literature include “transnational corporations” and “multinational enterprises.” Id.
2. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS—SUBSTANTIVE LAW
3–39, 55–62 (1987) (providing a history of the evolution of the corporate form, and in
particular of corporate groups).
3. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2002: Multinational Corporations and Export Competitiveness, 90,
UNCTAD/WIR/2002 (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//
wir2002_en.pdf (figure makes adjustments for the value-added nature of gross domestic
product as opposed to sales).
4. Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate
Power, at i, CORPORATE WATCH, Dec. 4, 2000, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/
corpwatch.org/downloads/top200.pdf (figure is based on a comparison of sales with
Gross Domestic Product).
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added, employing some 62 million workers and exporting goods and services valued at more than $4 trillion.5
Crucial to the success of these enterprises is the ability to incorporate
in one country while seeking out opportunities in one or more other
countries. Increasingly, these opportunities may be found in the developing world where resources are plentiful, labor is cheap, and regulation
weak or non-existent. Such countries are also often notorious for human
rights abuses in which MNCs may become involved.
For example, a number of civil actions were brought against the giant
U.S. energy company Unocol Corporation6 that alleged knowing involvement in human rights abuses by the Burmese military.7 The allegations arose from Unocal’s involvement in the production, transportation,
and sale of gas in Burma, the plaintiffs being villagers in the area through
which the gas pipeline passed.8 Security for the project was provided by
the Burmese military and it was alleged that the plaintiffs were subjected
to forced labor, as well as acts of murder, rape, and torture.9 Although
disputed by Unocal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found “evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact” that Unocal was aware
that the project had hired the Burmese military to provide these ser-

5. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006, FDI from Developing and Transition
Economies: Implications for Development, 5, UNCTAD/WIR/2006 (2006), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006overview_en.pdf.
6. CHEVRONTEXACO, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, available at http://www.chevron.com/
Investors/FinancialInformation/AnnualReports/2004/financials/. Prior to its merger with
ChevronTexaco (now Chevron), Unocal reported revenues of U.S.$8.2 billion, net earnings of U.S.$1.2 billion and total assets of U.S.$13.1 billion. UNOCAL CORPORATION,
ANNUAL REPORT 2004, available at http://www.chevron.com/Documents/Pdf/Unocal2004
AnnualReport.pdf.
7. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, and remanded, 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395
F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal
Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 334 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294,
1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The Union of Burma, otherwise known as Myanmar, will be referred to as Burma throughout this Article. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: Burma, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn
/35910.htm (last visited June 6, 2008) (The United States does not recognize the name
Myanmar, as the country is called by the ruling junta, although the United Nations does
use Myanmar.).
8. Doe v. Unocal Corp. 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, and remanded, 395 F.3d 932, 937–40 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g to en banc court
granted, 395 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Nat’l Coalition Gov’t of the Union of Burma
v. Unocal Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335–37 (C.D. Cal 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 1294, 1297–98 (C.D. Cal 2000).
9. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 939–40.
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vices.10 John Haseman, a former military attaché at the U.S. embassy in
Rangoon and consultant to Unocal reported that “egregious human rights
violations have occurred, and are occurring now, in southern Burma . . . .
Unocal, by seeming to have accepted [the Burmese Military]’s version of
events, appears at best naïve and at worst a willing partner in the situation.”11 Although the District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of Unocal, this was reversed by the Court of Appeals in respect of all but
the torture claims.12 That decision was appealed to an eleven judge en
banc court within the Ninth Circuit13 before the case was settled in December 2005.14
In another example, Canada’s largest energy company, Talisman Energy, Inc., was allegedly complicit in human rights abuses in the Sudan.15
The plaintiffs claimed that “Talisman worked with the [Sudanese]
[g]overnment to devise a plan of security for the oil fields and related
facilities,”16 “Talisman hired its own military advisors to coordinate military strategy with the [g]overnment,” and had “regular meetings with
Sudan’s army intelligence unit and the Ministry of Energy and Mining . .
. .”17 It was alleged that Talisman was aware that the government’s “protection” of oil operations, based on the joint Talisman and Sudanesegovernment strategy, entailed ethnic cleansing or genocide, the murder
or enslavement of substantial numbers of civilians (including women and
children), and the destruction of villages.18
Such incidents have given rise to the term “corporate complicity,”
which describes the alleged knowing involvement of corporations in human rights abuses committed by others. The key features that typically
arise in such cases are:
1. The defendant is a large, well-resourced transnational corporation.

10. Id. at 938.
11. Id. at 942.
12. Id. at 962.
13. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 979.
14. EarthRights International, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Unocal, Mar. 21,
2005, available at http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/final_settlement_reached_in_
doe_v._unocal.html.
15. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
299–301 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
16. Id. at 300.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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2. The alleged human rights abuses occurred in a country (the ‘host jurisdiction’) other than the transnational corporation’s country of incorporation (the ‘home jurisdiction’).
3. The host jurisdiction is unable and / or unwilling to investigate and
prosecute the alleged abuses.
4. The transnational corporation is alleged to be complicit in the human
rights abuses either directly or, more commonly, indirectly through the
interposition of subsidiaries or other intermediaries. . .19

To date, efforts to render MNCs accountable for such conduct have
fallen into one of three main categories. First, voluntary instruments such
as the United Nations Global Compact20 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises21 have encouraged corporations to observe and protect
human rights in the conduct of their business.22 Second, civil actions
have achieved limited success while also focusing attention on the issue.23 They do, however, face considerable procedural obstacles and, to
date, none have proceeded to judgment on the merits. Third, there have
been some attempts to impose statutory obligations on corporations conducting overseas operations to abide by minimum standards of conduct.
While bills have been introduced in both the United States24 and Australia,25 the political obstacles to securing the passage of such legislation are
considerable and, to date, neither has been passed.26
19. Jonathan Clough, Not-So-Innocents Abroad: Corporate Criminal Liability for
Human Rights Abuses, 11(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 5 (2005).
20. United Nations, Global Compact—What is the UN Global Compact?,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited June 2, 2008).
21. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], The OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Doc. 80761 (rev. ed. 2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
22. Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corporations Have
No Incentive to Define Human Rights 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 108–23 (2002).
23. See generally SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LITIGATION (Colin Harvey ed., 2004); BETH STEPHENS ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 131–214 (2d ed. 2008); Michael Byers, English Courts and Serious Human Rights Violations Abroad: A Preliminary Assessment, in
7 LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 241–49
(Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
24. Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 2782, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
25. Corporate Code of Conduct Bill, 2000 (Austl.).
26. The H.R. 2782 was referred to the House Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade on July 17, 2000. See WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, CENTER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (2000),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/08/1watch.cfm. The Australian bill was introduced

2008]

PUNISHING THE PARENT

903

Until recently there has been relatively little discussion of the application of domestic criminal law in this context.27 However, the nature of
corporate involvement in human rights abuses, coupled with the difficulty of securing prosecutions in the host jurisdiction, has focused attention on the potential liability of the parent corporation under the domestic
laws of the home jurisdiction. The issue was specifically raised in a recent survey of sixteen countries (“Surveyed Countries”) by the Fafo Institute for Applied Studies in Norway (“Fafo Institute Survey”).28 The
Surveyed Countries,29 representing a broad spectrum of both common
law and civil law traditions, were asked to provide information as to their
domestic laws relating to the accountability of MNCs.30 A specific recommendation arising out of the survey was that “consideration is required to explore how the components of complicity found in the different national legal systems surveyed might be applied to business entities.”31 This Article attempts to address that question.

after the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 was rejected by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities. See
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT STATUTORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS AND SECURITIES,
REPORT ON THE CORPORATE CODE OF CONDUCT BILL 2000, at 39 (2001), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/1999-02/
corp_code/report/report.pdf.
27. Clough, supra note 19, at 3. See also Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit:
Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 67 (2002);
Craig Forcese, Deterring “Militarized Commerce”: The Prospect of Liability for “Privatized” Human Rights Abuses, 31 OTTAWA L. REV. 171, 174–84 (2000) (discussing
several examples of corporate responsibility for human rights violations going unchecked). See generally Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal
Liability for Gross Violations of Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327
(2001).
28. ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT:
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW—A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN COUNTRIES, Executive Summary (Fafo
2006), available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf [hereinafter FAFO SURVEY].
This survey followed an earlier pilot study of five countries. FAFO & INTERNATIONAL
PEACE ACADEMY, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ASSESSING THE LIABILITY OF
BUSINESS ENTITIES FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Fafo 2003), available at http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/467.pdf.
29. The Surveyed Countries in the 2006 Fafo Survey are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
South Africa, Spain, the Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. FAFO
SURVEY, supra note 28, at 13.
30. Id. at 9–12.
31. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 28.
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Focusing on the common law jurisdictions of Australia,32 Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the United States,33 this Article analyzes the application of domestic principles of complicity to extraterritorial conduct by
corporations.34 The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an
overview of principles of complicity under the domestic law of these jurisdictions. Part II considers the legal bases by which criminal conduct
can be attributed to a corporation, particularly where the defendant forms
part of a corporate group. As the alleged abuses will have occurred outside the home jurisdiction, Part III discusses principles of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction. Part IV provides two examples of how legislative
provisions may be drafted in order to impose extraterritorial criminal
liability on corporations. The Article concludes that while the imposition
of such liability is theoretically possible, whether it is a practical option
is questionable. Nonetheless, it is argued that the underlying rationales
found in the criminal law provide ample justification for the enactment
of specific criminal statutes targeting corporate complicity in terms that
are appropriate for a corporate defendant. Models for such legislation
already exist both in the United States and elsewhere, providing an appropriate and potentially more effective means of prosecuting the parent
corporation for its complicity in human rights abuses by others.
Although the focus of this Article is on the liability of the parent corporation in the home jurisdiction, this is not to dismiss the importance of
pursuing the perpetrators in the host country.35 It simply recognizes that
there are many practical difficulties in doing so. Given that the ultimate
beneficiary of these enterprises is the parent, it is both logical and reasonable to seek means to render such corporations accountable for their
conduct. This Article explores one way in which that may be achieved
via criminal prosecution for complicity.

32. With respect to Australia, the focus will be on the relevant federal law, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Austl.).
33. With respect to the United States, references in this Article will be made to relevant federal provisions and also the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code.
34. See generally JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006);
JOSEPH, supra note 23. Because of its specific focus, this Article does not address broader
questions relating to the accountability of MNCs.
35. See Damian Betz, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible for Human
Rights Abuses Committed by Security Forces in Conflict-Ridden Nations: An Argument
Against Exporting Federal Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Regulating Corporate Behavior Abroad, 14 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 163, 202–05 (2002).

2008]

PUNISHING THE PARENT

905

I. PRINCIPLES OF COMPLICITY
Allegations against corporations do not typically allege that the corporation committed the abuses in its own right. Rather, the corporation is
said to have provided support to those who actually committed the
abuses, either by encouraging them and/or by providing some form of
assistance. Such conduct fits neatly within the general concept of criminal complicity, and this terminology has been regularly applied in this
context.36
Complicity is a well-established basis for criminal liability, tracing its
common law roots back to at least the fourteenth century,37 with similar
principles also evolving in civil law countries.38 It is almost universally
recognized as a legitimate basis for criminal liability, with all of the Surveyed Countries recognizing complicity as an offense under their domestic law.39 Principles of complicity are also recognized in international
law,40 being found in article 25(3) of the Rome Statute41 and accepted by
the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.42
The essence of complicity is easily stated; the accomplice is punished
because of his or her knowing involvement in the crime of another. It is
well established that these principles may also be applied to a corporation.43 While easily stated, liability for complicity presents significant
conceptual challenges even when applied domestically. Courts have
struggled to appropriately define the scope of liability, resulting in an
area of the law that “betrays the worst features of the common law: what
36. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in
Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339 (2001). Although beyond the scope of this Article, the related principles of conspiracy and incitement may
also be relevant in this context.
37. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
38. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, at 345.
39. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 16.
40. Although note conflicting U.S. authority as to whether aiding and abetting forms
part of the “law of nations” for the purposes of the Alien Tort Claims Act. See In re
South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320–24
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
41. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
42. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 6.3.2, 7.8
(Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT 95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 198, 207
(Dec. 10, 1998); FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 20.
43. John Henshall (Quarries), Ltd. v. Harvey, [1965] 2 Q.B. 233, 241 (U.K.); Nat’l
Coal Bd. v. Gamble, [1959] 1 Q.B. 11 (U.K.); R v. Robert Millar (Contractors), Ltd.,
[1970] 2 Q.B. 54 (U.K.).
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some would regard as flexibility appears here as a succession of opportunistic decisions by the courts, often extending the law, and resulting in
a body of jurisprudence that has little coherence.”44 These complexities
are magnified when different jurisdictions are considered, with each
country adopting different approaches to the same challenges. Although
a detailed analysis of principles of complicity is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is possible to summarize the key features that, with some
variation, are similar in each jurisdiction.
A. The Need for a Principal Offender
In contrast to inchoate offenses such as conspiracy and incitement, liability for complicity is derivative. That is, the liability of the accessory
is predicated on the commission of an offense (the “principal offense”)
by a “principal offender” or “principal.”45 Therefore, being an “accessory” is not an offense in its own right; the accused is a party to the principal offense and is tried and sentenced as a principal offender. Consequently, if there is no principal offense, there can be no liability for complicity. The trier of fact must therefore be satisfied, on the criminal standard, that the principal offense has been committed.
It might seem that this requirement would present a significant obstacle, particularly if the principal offense is alleged to have occurred in
another jurisdiction where there may be no prosecution of the principal
offender. However, it is not necessary for the alleged principal offender
to have been convicted of the principal offense. An accused may be
guilty of complicity even where a principal offender has not been identified. So long as the trier of fact is satisfied that the principal offense was
committed by some person, and is satisfied of the accused’s involvement
in that offense, then he or she may be liable as an accessory.46
In some circumstances, there will be no principal offense because the
principal offender is incapable of committing an offense. For example,
he or she may be a child below the age of criminal responsibility or an
adult who does not possess the necessary mens rea. Although a strict application of accessorial principles would deny liability as there is no

44. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 440 (5th ed. 2006).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1951); Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(1) (2007) (Austl.); Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 21(1)(a) (1985); Accessories and Abettors Act,
1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 94, § 8 (Eng.); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1951); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.06(1) (2001).
46. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(5) (2007) (Austl.); King v. R (1986) 161 C.L.R.
423, 433–36 (Austl.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(7) (2001); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 689 (4th ed. 2003).
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principal offense, the defendant may be liable under the doctrine of innocent agency.47
Where an act, which would be a crime if done by A, is caused by A to
be done by B, and B does not commit a crime by doing so, the law may
regard A as having acted by an innocent agent and as being guilty of the
crime as a principal offender.48
In such cases, the defendant is not actually liable as an accessory.
Rather, he or she is regarded as having committed the principal offense
through the agency of the innocent agent.
B. The Actus Reus of Complicity
For a relatively straightforward concept, the law of complicity has developed terminology of surprising complexity. At common law, an accessory was referred to either as a principal in the second degree or as an
accessory before the fact, depending on whether or not the accused was
present during the commission of the principal offense. The terminology
used to describe the conduct of an accessory was equally varied: aiding,
abetting, comforting, concurring, approbating, encouraging, consenting,
assenting, countenancing, counseling or procuring.49 Today, the most
common formulation is to say that the accused will be liable as an accessory if he or she “aids, abets, counsels or procures” the commission of
the principal offense.50 Similar terminology has been adopted in all of the
Surveyed Countries.51
Although these words have a specific meaning, but they are all “instances of one general idea, that the person charged . . . is in some way
linked in purpose with the person actually committing the crime, and is
by his words or conduct doing something to bring about, or rendering
47. Osland v. R (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 347–48 (Austl.). A more correct term is
“non-responsible” agent. Id.
48. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1951); Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.3 (2007)
(Austl.); Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 23.1 (1985); R v. Demirian [1989]
V.R. 97 (Austl.); R v. Cogan, [1976] Q.B. 217 (U.K.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a)
(2001).
49. R v. Russell [1959] V.R. 59, 66–67 (Austl.). See also LEFAVE, supra note 46, at
671.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1951); Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(1) (2007) (Austl.);
Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 94, § 8 (Eng.). In Canada, “counsel” is defined to include “procure, solicit or incite.” Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C.,
ch. C-46, § 22.3 (1985). The Model Penal Code refers only to “aids” and “solicits.”
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(i)(ii) (2001). The equivalent terms in civil law countries
are “l’aide et l’assistance, la fourniture des moyens.” Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, at
345.
51. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 18.
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more likely, such commission.”52 They are not, however, mutually exclusive because the conduct of the accused may fall within more than one
category. For example, it has been suggested that an act of abetting will
usually be implicit in, or associated with, an act of aiding.53
Traditionally, the phrase aiding and abetting was used when the accused was present at the commission of the principal offense, whereas
“counselling and procuring” described those situations in which the accused was absent.54 Corporate complicity would therefore typically involve counseling and procuring as assistance and/or encouragement is
provided prior to the commission of the offense. In any event, the distinction has now been removed in most jurisdictions and even in England, where this distinction is retained, it appears to have little practical
consequence.55 The same is true of the conflict between Australian and
U.K. authority on whether the words “aiding and abetting, counseling
and procuring” should be given their ordinary56 or their common law
meaning.57 In practical terms, even at common law the words are given
what would generally be regarded as their ordinary meanings.
For example, aiding is given its natural meaning of “give support to, . .
. help, assist.”58 Typical acts of aiding include providing materials or
other physical support, providing advice, or acting as a lookout. The essential feature of abetting is that the accused was present during the
commission of the principal offense and encouraged the commission of
that offense.59 Encouragement may be express or implied, and in some
cases the mere presence of the accused may provide encouragement to
the principal offender.60
Similarly, counseling involves advice or encouragement prior to the
commission of the offense, and has been interpreted as meaning “urged
or advised,”61 or to “advise” or “solicit.”62 Typical examples of counseling include providing advice on the commission of the offense, for ex52. R v. Russell [1933] V.R. 59, 67 (Austl.) (cited with approval in Giorgianni v. R
(1985) 156 C.L.R. 473, 493).
53. ASHWORTH, supra note 44, at 414.
54. Ferguson v. Weaving, [1951] 1 K.B. 814, 818–19 (U.K.).
55. ASHWORTH, supra note 44, at 414.
56. Attorney-Gen.’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 1 Q.B. 773, 779 (U.K.).
57. Giorgianni v. R (1985) 156 C.L.R. 473, 492 (Austl.).
58. R v. Beck (1990) 43 A. Crim. R. 135, 143 (Austl.); R v. Greyeyes, [1997] 2
S.C.R. 825, 837 (Can.).
59. R v. Russell (1933) V.R. 59, 67 (Austl.); R v. Salajko, [1970] 1 O.R. 824, 826
(Can.); Wilcox v. Jeffery, [1951] 1 All E.R. 464, 467 (K.B.) (U.K.).
60. R v. Coney, [1882] 8 Q.B.D. 534, 534 (U.K.).
61. Stuart v. R (1974) 134 C.L.R. 426, 445 (Austl.).
62. R v. Calhaem, [1985] 1 Q.B. 808, 813 (U.K.).
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ample by providing directions or inside knowledge, or simply by providing encouragement.
Procuring refers to conduct of the accused that goes beyond merely encouraging the commission of the principal offense and actually causes or
brings about its commission.63 An example of such conduct is when the
accused offers money for the offense to be committed. “To procure
means to produce by endeavour. You procure a thing by setting out to
see that it happens and taking the appropriate steps to produce that happening.”64 It is the only form of complicity that requires proof of a causal
connection between the accessory’s conduct and the commission of the
principal offense. In other cases, it is sufficient if the conduct of the accused can be described as assisting or encouraging the commission of
that offense, even though it did not cause its commission, and even if
ultimately it made no material difference to the outcome.65
In light of the above, and despite all the variation in terminology, complicity essentially consists of providing assistance and/or encouragement
to the principal offender. Such terms are broad enough to encompass
typical examples of what, in the corporate context, has been described as
direct complicity; that is, when a company knowingly assists in a human
rights violation.66 Examples include knowingly assisting in the forced
relocation of peoples in circumstances related to business activity67 or
providing financial or material support to security forces known to engage in human rights abuses.68 Such conduct not only involves the provision of assistance to the principal offender, but may also constitute encouragement of the principal offense. In circumstances in which a corporation has employed security forces who then commit human rights
abuses, it may even be said that the corporation has procured the commission of the principal offense by paying for and thereby causing its
commission.
In other cases, the alleged complicity may be the failure of the accused
to intervene and prevent the principal offense; that is, turning a blind eye.
In the corporate context, the term silent complicity has been used to describe those situations in which the corporation assists or encourages the
63. R v. Beck, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 22, 27–28 (U.K.).
64. Attorney-Gen.’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 1 Q.B. 773, 779 (U.K.). See
also LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 674.
65. THE LAW COMMISSION, PARTICIPATING IN CRIME, Law Com No. 305, ¶¶ 2.32–2.33
(2007). See also Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(2)(a) (2007) (Austl.).
66. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, 341–42.
67. Id. at 342.
68. Forcese, supra note 27, at 185 (discussing examples of “financial complicity” and
“material complicity”).
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human rights violation through its inaction.69 An example of such silent
complicity is when a corporation is aware of human rights abuses but
fails to raise any objection. In general, mere acquiescence in or assent to
the principal offense is not sufficient to constitute complicity unless it
can be said to encourage or assist the principal offense.70 However, silence or inaction may constitute complicity if, for example, that silence is
taken by the principal offender to constitute tacit approval and the accused remains silent knowing this to be the case.71 Consequently, silent
complicity could arise when a parent corporation is aware of a violation
by a subsidiary or an independent contractor, which in turn is aware of
the parent’s knowledge and is encouraged by the parent’s inaction. It is
also the case that when the defendant is under a legal duty to act, failure
to discharge that duty may constitute complicity.72 There is also some
limited authority that the failure of an employer to prevent an employee
from committing an offense may constitute complicity.73
Professor Clapham also refers to a third category of complicity, known
as beneficial or indirect complicity, in which a corporation benefits directly from human rights abuses committed by someone else. For example, the company may benefit from the suppression of peaceful protest
against its business activities or the use of repressive measures while
guarding company facilities.74 In the absence of conduct more akin to
direct or silent complicity, the mere fact of benefiting from a human
rights violation is unlikely to constitute complicity under domestic
criminal law. Such circumstances are more commonly addressed by specific legislation that prevents a person benefiting from the proceeds of
crime.
C. The Mens Rea for Complicity
Although the range of conduct that may amount to complicity is broad,
the mens rea element provides a significant limitation on its scope. Each
jurisdiction requires that the accused intended to assist or encourage the

69. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, 341–42.
70. R v. Phan (2001) 53 N.S.W.L.R. 480, 487 (Austl.). See also Wilcox v. Jeffery,
[1951] 1 All E.R. 464, 466 (K.B.) (U.K.); LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 672–73.
71. R v. Coney, [1882] 8 Q.B.D. 534, 540 (U.K.). For a discussion of similar concepts in international law, see Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, at 347–49.
72. THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 65, ¶ 2.26.
73. See generally R v. Gaunt, [2004] 2 Crim. App. 194 (U.K.); R v J.F. Alford
Transp. Ltd., [1997] 2 Crim. App. 326 (U.K.).
74. Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 36, at 347.
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commission of the principal offense.75 It is not enough that he or she did
so recklessly or unwittingly. Some jurisdictions also require that the defendant must “know the essential matters which constitute the principal
offense.”76 This does not mean that the accused must have been aware
that the conduct amounted to a criminal offense, as such an interpretation
would allow an accused to argue ignorance of the law as a defense.77 Nor
is it necessary to prove that the defendant knew the precise details of the
principal offense, such as time and place. It is sufficient that the accused
had knowledge of the principal offender’s intention to commit a crime of
the type that was in fact committed.78
The requirement of actual knowledge may be a significant impediment
to prosecution for complicity in human rights abuses. For example,
Dutch national Frans van Anraat was prosecuted for complicity in Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons because he allegedly supplied
the necessary chemicals during the 1980s.79 He was acquitted of this
charge on the basis that he did not know the use to which the chemicals
would be put.80 Similarly, Gus Van Kouwenhoven was charged with
complicity in the war crimes of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.81 Van Kouwenhoven operated a timber trading company in close
association with the former president, but was acquitted of complicity
charges due to lack of evidence that he had knowledge of the war
crimes.82
Because of these difficulties, some jurisdictions adopt a lesser mens
rea. For example, in Germany and the Netherlands, it is sufficient that
the defendant was aware of the conduct and showed “indifference toward
or acceptance of the chance that a proscribed result might occur.”83 This
75. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir. 2006); Giorgianni v. R (1985)
156 C.L.R. 473, 487–88 (Austl.); R v. Greyeyes, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 825, 842 (Can.). See
also Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002) (discussion of
the mens rea requirement in the United States).
76. Giorgianni, 156 C.L.R. at 487–88; Johnson v. Youden, [1950] 1 K.B. 544, 546
(U.K.). See generally United States v. Peoni, 100 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). See also
Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(3)(a) (2007) (Austl.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)
(2001); LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 675–83. The requirement of knowledge has also been
applied by the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 20.
77. Johnson, 1 K.B. at 546.
78. See generally R v. Bainbridge, [1960] 1 Q.B. 129 (U.K.).
79. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 19 n.17.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 20.
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is not generally the case in common law countries, although in the
United Kingdom it has been said that there are four different interpretations of the mens rea for complicity that require less than actual knowledge.84
Some concern has also been expressed that there must be a “shared intention” between the accomplice and the principal offender, and that this
may be difficult to apply in the context of corporate complicity as the
two actors may have different motivations for the conduct.85 Although in
most cases the accessory will share the principal offender’s intention that
the principal offense be committed, this is not, however, an essential requirement of secondary liability. That is, there is no need to show that
the accessory and principal offender were in agreement or shared a
common purpose.86
Further, it is important to remember the crucial distinction between intention and motive. Complicity requires that the accomplice intentionally
assisted the commission of the principal offense. While the accomplice’s
motive may be evidence of that intention, it is not an element of the offense. For example, security forces may commit murder because of government policy and/or racial hatred. A corporation that is complicit in
such conduct is still liable as an accessory notwithstanding that it was
motivated by business interests. Nor does it matter that the accomplice
did not wish the principal offense to be committed. An accomplice will
still be liable whether indifferent or horrified about what is to happen.87
One circumstance in which a lesser standard of mens rea is required is
where two or more people act in concert pursuant to a common purpose
or joint enterprise to commit an offense. Where the agreed offense is actually committed, each party to the joint criminal enterprise is liable as a
principal offender, irrespective of the actual role they played in its commission. More significantly, where the offense committed is different
from that intended by the group, each party will be liable if the offense
actually committed was a foreseeable consequence of the common pur84. THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 65, ¶ 2.65. The tests are:
(1) belief that P might commit the conduct element; (2) foresight of the risk of
a strong possibility that P will commit it; (3) contemplation of the risk of a real
possibility that P will commit it; and (4) foresight that it is likely that P will
commit it.
Id.
85. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 18–19.
86. Attorney-Gen.’s Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 1 Q.B. 773, 779 (U.K.).
87. Nat’l Coal Bd. v. Gamble, [1959] 1 Q.B. 11, 23 (U.K.) (cited with approval in
Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 539 (Sept. 2,
1998)); Dir. of Public Prosecutions for N. Ir. v. Lynch, [1975] 1 A.C. 653, 678 (H.L.).
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pose. In some jurisdictions, the level of foresight required is low, requiring only that the defendant foresaw the offense actually committed was a
possible consequence of the joint enterprise.88 In others, such as the
United States, the acts of the principal offender must have been a “natural and probable consequence” of the criminal scheme the accomplice
encouraged or aided.89 Although recognized in international law,90 the
doctrine is not universally adopted.
II. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Having considered the application of general principles of complicity
in the context of human rights abuses, it is necessary to consider how
those principles apply when the defendant is a corporation.91 Corporate
criminal liability is a relatively recent phenomenon, having evolved primarily in nineteenth century Anglo-American law as a response to the
increasing role of corporations during the industrial revolution.92 Although well established in many common law countries, civil law jurisdictions have generally been slower to recognize corporations as suitable
subjects for criminal prosecution.93 More commonly, these jurisdictions
rely upon civil or administrative penalties, although in some cases such
administrative penalties are much closer in form to criminal penalties.94

88. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 11.2(3)(b) (2007) (Austl.); Criminal Code of Canada,
R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 21(2), 22(2) (1985); McAuliffe & McAuliffe v. R (1995) 183 C.L.R.
108, 113–14 (Austl.); R v. Powell, [1999] 1 A.C. 1, 6–7 (H.L.) (U.K.).
89. LAFAVE, supra note 46, at 687.
90. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Law, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 75, 102–03 (2005).
91. The focus of this Article is on the liability of corporations as opposed to unincorporated entities which, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, are not subject to criminal liability in their own right. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 969 (2d ed. 1983). The Canadian Criminal Code defines “organization”
extremely broadly, and unincorporated entities fall within this definition. Criminal Code
of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 2 (1985).
92. For a history of corporate criminal liability see L.H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW, 15–42 (1969).
93. For a comparative perspective, see generally XIVTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS (Hans de Doelder &
Klauss Tiedemann eds., 1996).
94. THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CORPORATE KILLING 112–13 (2005) (Ir.); James
Gobert & Emilia Mugnai, Coping with Corporate Criminality—Some Lessons from Italy,
CRIM. L. REV. 619, 624 (2002).
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Nonetheless, eleven of the sixteen Surveyed Countries apply criminal
liability to legal persons, including corporations.95 These countries represent a range of legal traditions, suggesting that there is indeed growing
acceptance of corporate criminal liability. Although corporations are not
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), this
was apparently a result of procedural and definitional problems rather
than a challenge to the “conceptual assumption that legal persons are
bound by international criminal law.”96
While early authority suggested that a company could not be indicted
for manslaughter or any offense of violence,97 the weight of authority is
now to the effect that a corporation can commit any offense except those
which, by their nature, can only be committed by an individual.98 However, the individualistic nature of the criminal law, with its emphasis on
guilty acts and guilty minds, presents particular challenges for the imposition of corporate criminal liability. A corporation, as a legal fiction,
cannot act in its own right; it can only act through human agents. Accordingly, each jurisdiction has developed ways to render corporations
liable for the actions of individuals.
For example, U.S. federal courts apply principles of vicarious liability,
including for those offenses that require proof of mens rea.99 Other jurisdictions have adopted a modified form of vicarious liability whereby the
corporation will only be liable when the relevant conduct was engaged in
by a person within the company of sufficient seniority to be regarded as

95. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 13. Among the countries surveyed, this includes:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The five countries that do not permit
legal persons to be prosecuted for criminal offenses are: Argentina, Germany, Indonesia,
Spain, and the Ukraine. Id.
96. Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal
Law over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 23, at 139, 191.
97. People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 106–09 (N.Y. 1909); R v.
Cory Bros. & Co. Ltd., [1927] 1 K.B. 810, 815–17 (U.K.); R v. Great N. of Engl. Ry.
Co., [1846] 9 Q.B. 315, 326, 115 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1298 (Q.B.). The question was left
open by the Canadian Supreme Court in Union Colliery Co. v. R, [1900] 31 S.C.R. 81,
88–90 (Can.).
98. THE LAW COMMISSION, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES—CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, Working Paper No. 44, 23 (1972).
99. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,
494–95 (1909); Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir.
1962). See generally KATHLEEN BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 18–32
(4th ed. 2006).
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the “directing mind and will” of the company.100 Some jurisdictions,
most notably Australia and Canada, have enacted comprehensive provisions specifically addressing the criminal liability of corporations.101 Add
to these general models of liability a raft of specific statutory provisions
and the challenge is not so much devising a model of corporate criminal
liability, but choosing the most appropriate one.
It is not proposed to discuss the merits of the various models of corporate criminal liability.102 Less commonly analyzed, and representing a
particular challenge in the context of MNCs, is the question of how to
render a parent corporation liable for the conduct of its subsidiaries. The
analysis has so far proceeded on the simple model of a corporation directly involved in the assistance or encouragement of the conduct in the
host jurisdiction. In reality, this is rarely the case because the conduct of
the parent is carried out through the intermediary of a subsidiary or subsidiaries. For example, Unocal conducted its operations in Burma
through wholly owned subsidiaries,103 while Talisman conducted its operations in the Sudan through a consortium of oil companies called the
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, Ltd. (“GNPOC”).104
The rationale for interposing subsidiaries is easily understood; it minimizes risk and insulates the parent. Because of the principle of separate
corporate identity, the subsidiary or related company is treated as a separate legal entity.105 Consequently, the parent will generally not be liable
for the conduct of the subsidiary, despite the “commercial reality that
every holding company has the potential and, more often than not, in fact
does, exercise complete control over a subsidiary.”106 Further insulation
of the parent is provided by the principle of limited liability, whereby the

100. Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153, 171 (H.L.) (U.K.). See
also Hamilton v. Whitehead (1988) 166 C.L.R. 121, 127 (Tesco as applied in Australia);
Can. Dredge & Dock Co. v. R, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, 691–96.
101. Criminal Code Act, 1995, pt. 2.5 (2007) (Austl.); Criminal Code of Canada,
R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 22.1–22.2 (1985). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (2001).
102. See generally JONATHAN CLOUGH & CARMEL MULHERN, THE PROSECUTION OF
CORPORATIONS 64–182 (2002); JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING
CORPORATE CRIME 78–178 (2003).
103. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted,
395 F.3d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 2003).
104. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
105. Adams v. Cape Indus., PLC, (1991) Ch. 433, 536 (U.K.).
106. Briggs v. James Hardie & Co. (1989) 16 N.S.W.L.R. 549, 577 (Austl.). The situation is otherwise where the relevant conduct is carried out by an unincorporated division
of an incorporated entity. Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
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liability of shareholders, including corporate shareholders, is limited to
the unpaid amount of their investment. The extension of this principle,
designed to protect investors in the enterprise, to the enterprise itself is
one of the most significant factors in the success of MNCs because it
allows risk to be transferred to the (often undercapitalized) subsidiary.107
Thus, in the multi-tiered corporate group, with its first-tier, second-tier,
and even third-tier subsidiaries, traditional entity law provides multiple
layers of limited liability, with each upper-tier company insulated from
liability for its lower-tier subsidiaries. Four, or even five, layers of limited liability in complex multinational groups are not uncommon.108
While complex corporate structures and the use of subsidiaries is now
standard practice in the corporate world, the challenges they present are
not new. Nor are they limited to the sphere of human rights abuses. Particularly in the United States, ever since limited liability was extended to
corporate groups, courts have struggled to articulate a principled basis on
which to mitigate its more extreme consequences by rendering the parent
liable for the conduct of the subsidiary.109 This has involved courts applying principles of agency liability as well as so-called enterprise liability whereby the courts will pierce the corporate veil and impose liability
on the parent for the conduct of the group.110 “This theory recognizes that
when a parent and its subsidiary are part of an economically integrated
enterprise, there is, in effect, one corporate actor and consequently ‘all
components comprising the integrated group should accordingly be liable.’”111
While extensive, this body of jurisprudence is of little assistance. First,
even in the United States, there are “hundreds of decisions that are irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible,”112 with principles that have
been described as a “legal quagmire.”113 Second, there is limited authority for their application in the context of criminal liability, a rare example
being the prosecution of Exxon Corporation for the grounding of the

107. PHILLIP E. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW
58–60 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993).
108. Id. at 59.
109. See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 2.
110. See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at pp. 105–36.
111. Robert Iraola, Criminal Liability of a Parent Company for the Conduct of its Subsidiary: The Spillover of the Exxon Valdez, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 3, 9 (1995) (citing PHILLIP
I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION 967 (1983)).
112. BLUMBERG, supra note 107, at 86–87.
113. United States v. John-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
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Exxon Valdez oil tanker.114 In denying Exxon’s motion to dismiss, the
District Court apparently accepted both agency and enterprise theory as
grounds of Exxon Corporation’s liability for the conduct of its subsidiary.115 This decision is, however, of little precedential value as the corporations ultimately entered into a plea agreement for $150 million, which
was subsequently reduced to a $25 million fine and $100 million in restitution.116 Third, outside the United States, courts are more inclined to
adhere to the principle of separate corporate personality, with no clear
principle indicating the circumstances in which a court will be prepared
to lift the corporate veil in civil, let alone criminal, cases.117
Although of limited general application, such cases do serve to focus
attention on the concept of control as a means of rendering the parent
liable for the group.118 Given the variety of corporate structures, whether
a corporation controls another can be a complex question. Clearly there
must be something beyond the level of control inherent in the parentsubsidiary relationship. But in what circumstances should a group of
companies be regarded as an integrated entity rather than separate businesses? While the answer is obviously dependent on the circumstances,
“[w]hat should be critical to the analysis should be the reality of the relationship between parent and subsidiary and not the technical legal form
that it takes.”119 Relevant factors include the level of control actually exercised by the parent over the subsidiary, the extent to which the companies are economically integrated, the level of financial and administrative
interdependence, overlapping employment structures, and a common
group persona.120

114. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 CR, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1821 (D. Alaska
1990). See also United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Pa.
1964).
115. Iraola, supra note 111, at 8. See also H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 35 (1998).
116. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 2005).
117. See, e.g., Adams v. Cape Indus., PLC, (1990) Ch. 433, 476. See generally Ian M.
Ramsay & David B. Noakes, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia, 19 COMPANY &
SEC. L. J. 250 (2001).
118. BLUMBERG, supra note 107, at 59–60. See also William J. Rands, Domination of a
Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REV. 421, 433–46 (1999).
119. GOBERT & PUNCH, supra note 102, at 153. See also BLUMBERG, supra note 107, at
89–120.
120. BLUMBERG, supra note 107, at 94–95. See also United States v. John-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691–92 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986);
GOBERT & PUNCH, supra note 102, at 152.

918

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 33:3

While the common law is reluctant to look behind notions of separate
corporate identity and limited liability, it must be remembered that these
are simply legal fictions and are subject to legislative intervention. One
way in which this may be done is by imposing liability in functional
terms. By imposing liability upon corporations that “control” other corporations, the controlling corporation may then be made liable for the
conduct of the group.121 For example, under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967,122 when an employer controls a corporation
incorporated in a foreign country, any prohibited practice by that corporation is presumed to be the conduct of the employer.123 The determination of whether an employer controls a corporation is based upon four
factors: “the interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership or financial control, of the employer and the corporation.”124
Similarly, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 defines a “bank
holding company” to mean “any company which has control over any
bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company
by virtue” of this Act.125 Under section 1841(a)(2), any company has
control over a bank or company if:
(A) the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more
other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or
more of any class of voting securities of the bank or company;
(B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of
the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or
(C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that
the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence
over the management or policies of the bank or company.126

An alternative way of rendering the parent liable for the conduct of the
group would be to impose an obligation on the parent corporation to ensure that it takes reasonable steps to ensure that neither it, nor any of its
subsidiaries are engaged in specified offenses, irrespective of where they

121. BLUMBERG, supra note 107, at 107–16. In some cases, courts have interpreted
statutory provisions as imposing group liability in order to ensure that legislative intention was not frustrated. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (discussing
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
122. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (2006).
123. Id. § 623(h)(1).
124. Id. § 623(h)(3).
125. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2006).
126. Id. §1841(a)(2)(A)–(C).
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occur.127 The advantage of such an obligation is that it avoids the need
for attribution and focuses on the failure of the corporation itself:
Where a statutory duty to do something is imposed on a particular person . . . and he does not do it, he commits the actus reus of an offence. .
. . but this is not a case of vicarious liability. If the employer is held liable, it is because he personally has failed to do what the law requires
him to do and he is personally not vicariously liable. There is no need
to find someone—in the case of a company, the brains and not merely
the hands—for whose act the person with the duty be held liable.128

Corporate liability for a failure to act is a well-established basis of liability, particularly in the area of workplace safety, where there is a duty
to ensure a safe workplace. A similar concept is apparently found in Italy, where a corporation can be made liable for “structural negligence;”
that is, failing to ensure that suitable systems were in place to prevent an
the commission of an offense.129 In the context of complicity, the Model
Penal Code provides that a defendant will be liable as an accomplice if,
“having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, [he or she]
fails to make proper effort so to do . . . with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense.”130
By focusing on what the corporation failed to do, liability for omissions allows a broad range of factors to be taken into account, allowing
an assessment of the “culture” of the organization. Any danger that the
provision is overbroad can be minimized by providing for an appropriate
fault element, such as criminal negligence, or by allowing a due diligence defense. In the context of MNCs, liability for the failure resides
with the parent itself, rather than in the complex web of its subsidiaries.
However, even if corporate liability may be imposed in enterprise terms,
rendering the company liable for the conduct of those entities that it controls, an additional challenge remains. In what circumstances can the
criminal law apply extraterritorially?

127. Olivier De Schutter, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as a Tool for Improving the
Human Rights Accountability of Transnational Corporations 44–45 (Catholic Law Sch.
& Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Background Paper, Nov. 3, 2006),
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Olivier-de-Schutter-report-for-SRSGre-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-Dec-2006.pdf.
128. John Smith, Case Commentary, Health and Safety at Work: R v. British Steel,
PLC, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 655. See also LAW COMMISSION, CRIMINAL LAW: INVOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER, Consultation Paper No. 135, 129 (1994).
129. Gobert & Mugnai, supra note 94, at 626.
130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (2001).
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III. PRINCIPLES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
There is a general presumption that criminal laws are local in operation
and apply only in the sovereign territory of the state that enacted the
law.131 This territorial principle is almost universally recognized and is
the most common basis for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.132 Although intended to limit the reach of criminal laws, the principle of territoriality may nonetheless encompass extraterritorial conduct in some
cases. In particular, the doctrine of ubiquity allows a state to exert jurisdiction over an offense when only part of the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction.133 This is particularly relevant in the context of
complicity, where the act of complicity may occur in the home jurisdiction, even though the principal offense occurred in the host jurisdiction.
Although at common law the application of this doctrine in such cases
was limited,134 this position may of course be altered by clear legislative
intention. For example, under section 20 of the Misuse of Drugs Act
1971, it is an offense for a person to assist in or induce the commission in
any place outside the United Kingdom an offense punishable under the
provisions of a corresponding law in force in that place.135 It is therefore
possible for an appropriately drafted statute to impose liability on a parent corporation for complicity with respect to conduct occurring within
the home jurisdiction, even though the principal offense is intended to be
committed in the host jurisdiction. This doctrine has particular significance in the context of corporate liability as corporate offenders, unlike
individuals, can be in more than one place at one time. Unless the corporation’s operations are completely restricted to the host jurisdiction, it is
likely that at least some of the relevant conduct will have occurred in the
home jurisdiction. For example, although the provision of assistance may
have occurred primarily in the host jurisdiction, executive approval may
have been given in the home jurisdiction. It may therefore be argued that

131. Treacy v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 561 (U.K.). See generally
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991);
R v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 805–12 (Can.).
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. c (1987); DAVID
LANHAM, CROSS-BORDER CRIMINAL LAW 30 (1997); Council of Europe: European Committee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 3 CRIM. L.F. 441, 446
(1992) (hereinafter Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction).
133. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 446–47, 462.
134. MICHAEL HIRST, JURISDICTION AND THE AMBIT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 129 (Andrew Ashworth ed., 2003).
135. Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971, 1971, § 20, sched. 1 (Eng.). See also Crimes Act
1958, § 181 (1958) (Vict.).
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the home jurisdiction may assert jurisdiction as part of the offending
conduct occurred within its jurisdiction.
In any event, the enactment of extraterritorial laws in this context is
clearly justified on two bases. The first is the principle of universal jurisdiction, which recognizes the right of any country to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant with respect to “universal crimes” such as piracy, genocide, and war crimes.136 Jurisdiction may be exercised irrespective of the
nationality of the defendant or the locus of the offense, with such sweeping jurisdiction being justified by the egregious nature of the conduct and
the need to limit the availability of safe havens for those accused of such
crimes.137 A number of the Surveyed Countries impose universal jurisdiction with respect to crimes under the Rome Statute.138 However, given
the need for the defendant to have some presence in the jurisdiction in
order to be prosecuted, it is argued that the second basis of jurisdiction,
the nationality or active personality, provides a more sound rationale for
extraterritoriality in the context of corporate defendants.
This second principle recognizes that a state may extend the application of its criminal laws to its own nationals wherever they may be located. It is widely recognized as a basis of extraterritorial criminal laws
and is adopted by a number of the Surveyed Countries with respect to
Rome Statute crimes committed by their nationals.139 For example, the
International Criminal Court Act of 2001 (U.K.) imposes liability for
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and applies extraterritorially to acts committed outside the jurisdiction by U.K. nationals or
residents.140
There are essentially two rationales for a country’s imposition of extraterritorial criminal liability on its own nationals. First, it is a means for
136. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 453. See also LANHAM,
supra note 132, at 37–38.
137. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 453.
138. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 16. Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain and
the United Kingdom are examples among the countries surveyed. Id. Under articles six
through eight of the Rome Statute, these offenses are genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes. Rome Statute, supra note 41, arts. 6–8.
139. FAFO SURVEY, supra note 28, at 16. Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Africa, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States
are examples among the countries surveyed. Id. It is apparently recognized and applied in
civil law countries more commonly than in common law countries; HIRST, supra note
134, at 46, 201.
140. International Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, § 51 (2001) (U.K.). Liability also
extends to ancillary conduct such as aiding and abetting. See id. at §§ 51, 55. See also
Criminal Code Act, 1995, ch. 8 (2007) (Austl.); Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, ch. 24 § 8 (Can.).
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states to subject “their own nationals to certain national norms and [to
protect] fundamental interests from attacks by a state’s own nationals
from abroad.”141 This rationale is clearly applicable in the context of ensuring the observance of international human rights norms by MNCs.
Second, it allows those countries that do not extradite their own nationals
to ensure that offenses by those nationals do not go unprosecuted. This
rationale assumes particular significance in the context of MNCs because
a corporation cannot be extradited.
Extradition is a process whereby one state will surrender a person for
prosecution in another state. The mechanism by which defendants are
extradited has evolved in the context of the physical transfer of an individual and there is no precedent for the “extradition” of a corporation.142
Although it has been suggested that “[a] corporation . . . may be made to
answer through extradition proceedings, just as a natural person would
be,”143 it is difficult to see how this can in fact be achieved. While a corporation may commit a criminal offense in one jurisdiction even though
it was incorporated in another,144 a corporation cannot physically move
from one jurisdiction to another. There is therefore no way in which a
host jurisdiction may compel the “transfer” of a corporate defendant to
face charges in that jurisdiction. Nor is there any power by which to extradite individual officers or employees of the organization unless they
are charged in their own right. Even if personally charged, there is no
compulsion on them to appear as the company unless directed to by the
company itself.145
The host jurisdiction is therefore faced with two options. First, it may
proceed in absentia. While ordinarily the trial of serious criminal offenses requires the personal presence of the defendant,146 courts may
proceed in absentia when, for example, the accused has absconded or is
141. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 448. See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
142. GOBERT & PUNCH, supra note 102, at 157. See also De Schutter, supra note 127,
at 24.
143. ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT:
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW—A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN COUNTRIES, SURVEY RESPONSE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 19 (Fafo 2006).
144. McNabb v. T. Edmondson & Co. (1941) V.L.R. 193 (Austl.) (relying on an inference from Home Benefits Proprietary, Ltd. v. Crafter (1939) 61 C.L.R. 701, where the
High Court upheld a conviction against a foreign company, the issue passing sub silentio).
145. GOBERT & PUNCH, supra note 102, at 157.
146. Of course, even where a corporation is present in the jurisdiction, it can only ever
appear by representative.

2008]

PUNISHING THE PARENT

923

otherwise absent.147 In some jurisdictions, specific provision is made for
proceedings in absentia when a corporate defendant does not appear.148
Alternatively, the corporation may submit to the jurisdiction. While
initially it may seem unusual that a corporation would voluntarily submit
to a criminal prosecution, it may ultimately be in the company’s interest
to do so. For example, the company may have significant business interests in the jurisdiction, which may be jeopardized if it does not cooperate. It is notable that all of the prosecutions of foreign corporations under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) appear to have been the result of guilty pleas.149
In either case, even if the host jurisdiction were to return a verdict
against the defendant corporation in absentia, such a verdict would only
be enforceable against those assets of the corporation that remained in
the jurisdiction. The enforcement of a criminal judgment beyond those
assets would be extremely problematic and would require the cooperation of the home jurisdiction. A verdict in absentia may also give rise to
arguments of double jeopardy if another jurisdiction were to subsequently try the corporation. Given the practical difficulties surrounding
extradition of corporate defendants, it is argued that the nationality principle provides a clear justification for the prosecution of corporations for
extraterritorial conduct. The difficulty lies in determining the nationality
of a corporation. There are a number of determinants that may be applied, including the “siége local” (principal place of management), the
locality of the principal shareholder, the principal place of business, or
the place of incorporation.150 Of these, the most feasible determinants are
principal place of business and place of incorporation.
Principal place of business as a jurisdictional basis is well known in
civil proceedings, and requires that the entity do business “not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity”
in the jurisdiction.151 The activities within the jurisdiction need not be
conducted by the foreign corporation itself, but may be performed on its
behalf by an agent.152 It therefore allows the prosecution of a corporation

147. R v. Jones (No. 2) (1972) 1 W.L.R. 887 (Austl.).
148. Crimes Act 1958, § 359(B) (1958) (Vict.).
149. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (1998); Paul D. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 116 (2007).
150. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 466.
151. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 329
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 58 (2d
Cir. 1985)).
152. Ken Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000).
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irrespective of where it is incorporated, so long as its principal place of
business was in the prosecuting country.
While it would therefore seem to be an ideal jurisdictional basis for
corporate prosecutions, and is used as such in the FCPA,153 this strength
is also its weakness. The possibility that a company may have more than
one place of business raises one of the primary concerns in relation to the
assertion of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, which is that it may give
rise to competing jurisdictional claims.154 Ordinarily such disputes in the
criminal law would be resolved by the extradition process, as there is no
criminal law equivalent of forum non conveniens. In essence, the jurisdiction that has the defendant is ultimately the one that has the ability to
prosecute. However, this does not apply in the case of a corporate defendant which, as already discussed, cannot be extradited. Consequently,
there is the possibility that a corporate defendant could be prosecuted in
more than one jurisdiction.
Accordingly, for reasons of “certainty and convenience,” it is submitted that place of incorporation is the most appropriate basis for determining nationality.155 In contrast to the other determinants, the place of incorporation is easily established. It is also fixed as each corporate entity
can have only one place of incorporation and hence one nationality. This
helps to avoid competing jurisdictional claims and also provides a level
of certainty, which is essential in the context of criminal liability. Defendants, whether corporate or individual, are entitled to be able to ascertain
with some predictability their potential criminal liability.
In applying this principle to MNCs, it must be remembered that although often described as entities in their own right, MNCs are merely “a
group of corporations, each established under the law of some state,
linked by common managerial and financial control and pursuing integrated policies.”156 A company incorporated in another jurisdiction is a
new and distinct entity. The nationality of each constituent corporation is
therefore determined separately and not by reference to its parent or related corporations. For example, it has been alleged that an Australian
company, Anvil Mining Ltd., was complicit in war crimes committed by
soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo.157 The crimes, which in153. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B) (defining domestic concern).
154. Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 132, at 465.
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 213 cmt. c (1987). See, e.g.,
Dempster v. Nat’l Companies & Sec. Comm’n (1993) 9 W.A.R. 215 (Austl.) (application
of the nationality principle in the context of a corporate criminal prosecution).
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 213 cmt. f (1987).
157. David Lewis, Congo Court Urges Massacre Trial for Foreign Miners, REUTERS,
Oct. 16, 2006, available at http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId
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cluded summary executions, rape, and looting, were alleged to have occurred near the town of Kilwa.158 After the town was seized by rebels in
October 2004, government soldiers counter-attacked, killing at least seventy three people according to a 2005 UN investigation.159 Anvil’s silver
and copper mines are near the town, and the company’s trucks and airplanes were used by the army during the operation.160 It was alleged that
in failing to withdraw the vehicles, the Anvil staff members “knowingly
facilitated (the actions of) the accused . . . when they committed the war
crimes.”161 Anvil claimed that the vehicles were requisitioned by the
military and that it had no choice but to hand them over.162
In 2004, Anvil Mining underwent a corporate restructuring whereby
the Australian company, Anvil Mining NL, was acquired by the Canadian company, Anvil Mining Ltd.163 Anvil NL became a wholly owned
subsidiary of Anvil Mining Ltd., and its shares of Anvil NL were delisted
from the Australian and Berlin Stock Exchanges.164 Anvil NL remains
incorporated in Australia, but under the name Anvil Mining Management
NL.165
Applying place of incorporation as the test of nationality, Canada
would have jurisdiction to prosecute Anvil Mining, while Australia could
prosecute Anvil Mining Management NL. Applying the place of business
test, Australia would have jurisdiction over Anvil Mining and Anvil
Mining NL since, although Anvil Mining is incorporated in Canada, its
principal place of business is in Australia.166 However, even if a case
proceeded to judgment, the ability to enforce that judgment would be
limited to the assets of the company within Australia.

=L16676754. In another recent example, a civil action has been brought against the U.S.
coal company Drummond alleging that the company offered money and cars to rightwing paramilitary gunmen to kill union leaders at one of its mines in Northern Columbia.
Verna Gates, Drummond’s Colombia Rights Trial Begins in Alabama, REUTURS, July 9,
2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN7928491520070709.
158. Lewis, supra note 157.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
162. Id.
163. Anvil Mining Limited, CAN. STOCK REV., Mar. 3, 2006, available at http://www.
canstock.com/shownews.php?article_id=29.
164. Id.
165. Australian Securities and Investments Commission, http://www.search.asic.
gov.au (follow “Company Search” hyperlink; then search by organization name for “Anvil Mining Management NL”).
166. ANVIL MINING, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 65, available at http://www.anvilmining
.com/files/Anvil_AR06_lo-res_March26.pdf.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that in principle there is an underlying doctrinal framework that would allow for the prosecution of
corporations for complicity in human rights abuses occurring outside the
host jurisdiction. While the imposition of such liability is theoretically
possible, it compounds complexity upon complexity, combining three
areas of law that have evolved primarily with individuals in mind, and
applying them to circumstances for which they are not ideally suited.
Even if the political will could be found to bring such a prosecution, doctrinal difficulties would be exacerbated by problems of gathering evidence in foreign jurisdictions. Large corporations are likely to contest
such charges vigorously. Is there any possibility of success?
It is suggested that the best chance of a successful prosecution is to enact specific provisions tailored to corporate defendants and imposing extraterritorial liability. A model of what may be achieved can be found in
the FCPA, which imposes extraterritorial criminal liability with respect
to certain practices involving the bribery of foreign officials. For the purposes of illustration, this Article focuses on section 78dd-2, which applies to domestic concerns, and section 78dd-3, which applies to domestic concerns and persons other than issuers.167 Under section 78dd-2(a), it
is an offense for any domestic concern “or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such domestic concern or any stockholder thereof
acting on behalf of such domestic concern, to make use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of [certain prohibited transactions relating to foreign officials].”168 It
expressly applies to U.S. corporations, as well as organizations with their
principal place of business in the United States.169 Jurisdiction under the
FCPA also extends to conduct of a “United States person” acting outside
the United States, whether or not the person “makes use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce.”170 Extraterritorial
jurisdiction in such cases is based on the nationality principle because
“United States person” is defined to include corporations organized under the laws of the United States.171
The extraterritorial reach of the FCPA is further extended by section
78dd-3(a), which makes it an offense for any person, “while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994) (applies to issuers).
Id. § 78dd-2(a).
Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B).
Id. § 78dd-2(i)(1).
Id. § 78dd-2(i)(2).
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means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in
furtherance of [a prohibited transaction].”172 “Person” for these purposes
is defined to include corporations organized under the law of a foreign
nation.173 Consequently, the United States may exercise criminal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation with respect to conduct occurring primarily outside the United States, so long as the corporation made use of the
mails or the Internet in the United States.174 It does not require that the
corporation had its principal place of business in the United States, so
long as it had some presence in the jurisdiction.175
Although this provision is not phrased in traditional complicity terms,
the term “in furtherance” of is apt to encompass a broad range of conduct
associated with the prohibited transactions. As a U.S. federal statute,
principles of vicarious liability apply and the extraterritorial reach of the
legislation is clear, relying expressly upon either objective territoriality
or nationality. However, even the most well-drafted provision is meaningless without the political will to prosecute and it is in this respect that
the FCPA is perhaps most notable.
Criminal prosecutions under the FCPA can only be brought by the U.S.
Department of Justice176 and a summary of prosecutions under the FCPA
reveals that the Department has pursued such prosecutions with some
vigor.177 Prior to 1998, it appears that FCPA prosecutions primarily involved U.S. corporations operating directly in foreign countries.178 However, the Act was amended in 1998 to expand its extraterritorial reach.179
Since then, in addition to prosecutions against U.S. corporations,180 there
172. Id. § 78dd-3(a).
173. Id. § 78dd-3(f)(1).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (1994).
175. Id.
176. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 9, 12 (1977) (stating that criminal prosecutions
under the FCPA are brought by the Department of Justice). Civil enforcement actions
may be brought by the Securities Exchange Commission.
177. See generally Danforth Newcomb & Philip Urofsky, FCPA Digest of Cases and
Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, Feb. 13, 2008, available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/
FCPA_Digest.pdf.
178. Id. at 58–80.
179. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
180. Newcomb & Urofsky, supra note 177, at 42 (discussing United States v. DPC
(Tianjin) Co. No. CR 05-482 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). See also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Monsanto Co., No. 1:05-CR-00008 (D.D.C. 2005), available at
http://corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/monsantoagreement.pdf; Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Justice and InVision Techs., Inc. (Dec. 3, 2004), available at
http://corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/invision1.pdf; Agreement between Crimi-
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have been prosecutions successfully targeting U.S. corporations operating through subsidiaries,181 foreign corporations operating through subsidiaries,182 and a foreign issuer listed on the New York Stock Exchange.183 Of eight prosecutions brought against corporations since 1998,
four were against foreign corporations.184 Of the new investigations
commenced between 2005 and 2007, nineteen of the twenty-four have
been of U.S. corporations or a combination of U.S. and foreign corporations, with five directed solely at foreign corporations.185
In another example of corporate criminal liability for extraterritorial
conduct, the U.S. multinational Chiquita Brands International, Inc., recently pleaded guilty to engaging in prohibited transactions with a designated terrorist organization.186 Chiquita pleaded guilty to making payments via a Colombian subsidiary to the United Self-Defense Forces of
Columbia (“AUC”).187 The payments were made in response to threats of
harm to the company’s personnel and property, and were approved by
senior executives who were aware that the AUC was a terrorist organization.188
Another useful precedent may be found in division 270 of the Australian Criminal Code Act of 1995, which creates a number of offenses relating to slavery. Of particular relevance, section 270.3 provides that a
person (including a corporation)189 who, whether within or outside Australia, intentionally:

nal Div., Fraud Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Micrus Corp. (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/micrus.pdf.
181. Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Justice and SSI Int’l Far East, Ltd., No. 3:06CR-00398 (D. Or. 2006), available at http://www.secinfo.com/d1znFa.v22t.d.htm. See
also Newcomb & Urofsky, supra note 177, at 47, 54 (discussing United States v. Titan
Corp., No. CR-05-314 (S.D. Cal. 2005) and United States v. Syncor Taiwan, Inc., No.
CR-02-1244 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
182. Newcomb & Urofsky, supra note 177, at 31, 49–50 (discussing United States v.
Vetco Gray Controls Inc., No. 07-CR-004 (S.D. Tex. 2007) and United States v. ABB
Vetco Gray, Inc. (S.D. Tex. 2004)).
183. In the Matter of Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54,599, 89 SEC Docket
283, 286 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/3454599.pdf.
184. Newcomb & Urofsky, supra note 178, at 4.
185. Id. at 2–3.
186. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making
Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization and Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine,
Mar. 19, 2007, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 12.1 (2007) (Austl.).
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(a) possesses a slave or exercises over a slave any of the other powers
attaching to the right of ownership; or
(b) engages in slave trading; or
(c) enters into any commercial transaction involving a slave; or
(d) exercises control or direction over, or provides finance for:
(i) any act of slave trading; or
(ii) any commercial transaction involving a slave;
is guilty of an offense.190

Again, it should be noted that this offense is couched in broad terms
and is not limited in the same way as traditional concepts such as “aiding
and abetting.” Phrases such as “exercises control or direction over” and
“provides finance for” are apt to cover a broad range of circumstances,
and are particularly appropriate for corporate involvement in such offenses. On the other hand, unlike complicity under the general criminal
law, the defendant in this case is not tried as a principal offender, but is
punished for this specific offense. The section includes language that is
explicitly extraterritorial in operation, and principles of corporate criminal liability are found in part 2.5 of the Act.
These are just two examples of legislative provisions that have been
drafted in order to impose extraterritorial criminal liability on corporations. More importantly, the number of prosecutions under the FCPA
shows just what can be achieved when the political will to enforce such
statutes exists.
CONCLUSION
[I]t is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes . . .191

This Article has sought to demonstrate that it is possible to impose
domestic criminal liability upon MNC’s with respect to their involvement in human rights abuses outside their home jurisdiction. Such liability is justified not only because of the difficulty of pursuing offenders in
the host jurisdiction, but because of the culpability of the parent corporation itself. Principles of separate corporate identity cannot be allowed to
conceal the fact that these operations are ultimately controlled by, and for
the benefit of, the parent corporation. Parent corporations should not be

190. Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 270.3(1) (2007) (Austl.).
191. Rome Statute, supra note 41, pmbl.
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able to reap the benefits of distinct corporate identity yet disown their
subsidiaries when issues of accountability arise.
It has been demonstrated that principles of complicity may be applied
to such conduct, that models of corporate fault exist, and that extraterritoriality may be justified on the basis of corporate nationality. Although
this places the responsibility on the home jurisdiction, the situation may
be seen as analogous to those countries that refuse to extradite their own
nationals. Given the absence of effective international regulation and the
inability of other countries to prosecute, it is incumbent upon the home
jurisdiction to control the conduct of those corporations that are incorporated under its laws.192
While such prosecutions are theoretically possible under existing
criminal law principles, it is suggested that the complexities are such that
the chances of a successful prosecution are slim. Far more appropriate is
to use these underlying principles to inform the drafting of legislation
specifically addressing corporate involvement in human rights abuses.
Such an approach avoids the strict application of traditional accessorial
principles in favor of provisions that reflect the reality of corporate complicity. It also allows the basis of corporate fault to be clearly articulated
and the extraterritorial reach of the laws expressly stated. Drafting specific laws also facilitates international agreement by allowing jurisdictions to adapt the provisions to their own circumstances. In particular,
some jurisdictions do not recognize corporate criminal liability at all,
preferring instead to impose civil or administrative sanctions.193
The merits of such an approach can be seen in the FCPA. Since its passage in 1976—a response to widespread bribery of foreign officials by
U.S. corporations194—the United States has been instrumental in lobbying for a range of international instruments prohibiting the practice.195
Recent decades have seen a significant number of successful prosecutions against both U.S. and foreign corporations with respect to conduct
occurring outside the United States.196 While the FCPA is by no means
192. Stephens, supra note 27, at 83.
193. Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 44–46 (2002). See also United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Mar. 31, 2005).
194. See Logan Michael Breed, Regulating Our 21st-Century Ambassadors: A New
Approach to Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 42 VA. J. INT’L L.
1005, 1028–29 (2002).
195. Phillip I. Blumberg, Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers
Presented by Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 297, 315 (2001).
196. See Stephens, supra note 193, at 2–3.
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the only model, it disproves the suggestion that it is not possible to
prosecute large corporations with respect to extraterritorial conduct. With
appropriate legislation and political will it clearly can be done.
Criminal prosecution of corporations under domestic law will never be
the complete answer. It should, however, be part of an international response. According to the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities
of Multinational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, states have an obligation to ensure that MNCs
and other business enterprises respect human rights.197 While an integrated response should involve a range of accountability mechanisms, it
is the state of incorporation that has the practical ability to impose criminal sanctions on the parent corporation. Such accountability is particularly important given that corporations are not subject to the jurisdiction
of the ICC. The imposition of criminal sanctions, however, goes beyond
the issue of accountability. It is also a mechanism through which society
expresses its condemnation and represents an unequivocal rejection of
that conduct. Complicity in egregious human rights abuses is not just a
matter of doing business. The application of extraterritorial criminal laws
is one mechanism whereby such conduct is condemned irrespective of
where it occurs.

197. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html.

